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Thesis Summary
This thesis analyzes transfer spending and performance data from English Premier
League football clubs participating in the 1992-2021 seasons of the English Premier League
using regression analysis and Granger causality analysis. The analysis attempts to extend
existing research that indicates a significant causal relationship between transfer spending and
performance. I then speak to the sustainability of transfer spending necessary to improve
performance over a specified length of time. Further discussion considers implications of
Financial Fair Play regulations and explores relevant case studies of Blackburn Rovers,
Manchester City, Chelsea, Leicester City, and Newcastle United.
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Introduction
Most fans of the National Football League (NFL), National Basketball Association
(NBA), National Hockey League (NHL), and Major League Baseball (MLB) are familiar with
the concept of a salary cap, or (in the case of the MLB) a luxury tax system, that governs how
franchises may spend money to acquire or retain players. In a salary cap system, a league sets a
dollar amount which serves as the limit each franchise can spend on player salaries in a given
year. In a luxury tax system, a league does not set an absolute salary limit but instead to
discourage spending in excess of the salary cap imposes a “tax” (i.e., a monetary penalty) on
teams that breach a designated salary threshold. Both of these systems are designed to encourage
competitive balance.
Because of this, it is only natural for American sports fans to take a look at the way the
English Premier League (EPL) operates with no spending limit and scratch their heads. How is it
fair when some teams are spending a great deal more than other teams to acquire the best players
in the world? Many American sport fans question, “Why aren’t more European football fans
outraged at this unequal system?”
Fans familiar with the EPL system of transfer spending may wonder how sustained
higher spending equates to football success. In addition, how quickly should on-the-pitch success
follow? Conventional wisdom suggests that higher spending will lead to better performance, but
how well does conventional wisdom hold true under deeper inspection? Stakeholders in
European football including, but not limited to, owners, managers, and fans may be interested in
the speed with which increased spending affects performance on the field.
After conducting a review of existing literature, this thesis investigates the relationship
between transfer spending and performance by conducting regression analysis and Granger
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causality analysis. Furthermore, this thesis then tackles other items associated with transfer
spending such as the speed of its impact and how continuous the transfer spending must be. An
in-depth regression analysis of changes in transfer spending and changes in final place in the
standings should shed some light on how strong this relationship is. Meanwhile, Granger
causality analysis provides empirical evidence on the direction of the relationship and how
quickly increases in transfer spending lead to higher levels of on-field performance. Case studies
of a few differently positioned clubs in the EPL, Blackburn Rovers, Manchester City, Chelsea,
Leicester City, and Newcastle United illustrates some of the conclusions that are drawn from the
data.

Literature Review
As this thesis explores the general connection between on field performance and the
resulting financial ramifications for football clubs, there is perhaps nothing that is more relevant
to consider than Financial Fair Play (FFP). FFP consists of two major provisions: the no overdue
payables rule and the break-even rule (Plumley, Ramchandini, & Wilson, 2018).
Plumley et al. (2018) investigated whether FFP policies have been successful in
achieving competitive balance. Club owners, media analysts, and fans have argued that FFP,
rather than improving competitive balance, has conversely weakened competition in the “Big 5”
domestic leagues in England, Germany, Spain, Italy, and France. In order to investigate this
claim, recognized metrics of competition and dominance are analyzed in each league in the six
seasons prior to the implementation of FFP (pre-FFP), and the six seasons following FFP (postFFP). Statistical analysis supported claims that FFP has decreased competitive balance. In every
league, decline in competitive balance is observed, with the decline statistically significant in
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Germany, Spain, and France. The weakened competitive environment is most likely due to the
break-even provision of the rule which requires that clubs do not spend more than they bring in
via revenue. This has allowed the biggest clubs with the largest revenues to consistently spend
more than smaller clubs while providing no avenue for smaller clubs to close that gap (Plumley
et al., 2018).
By analyzing the correlation between ownership and performance in the UEFA
Champions League in the time period before and after the implementation of FFP policies, Jaker
and Gerretson (2021) attempt to understand this relationship. The FFP policies imposed
restrictions on clubs by limiting spending to earnings in order to promote efficient, sustainable
business models. Prior to FFP’s implementation, ownership model played a very significant role
in predicting success in the Champions League. Generally, private ownership suggests greater
investment and thus higher spending on players. However, in the Post-FFP era the significant
relationship between ownership structure and spending ceased to exist. This is probably due to
FFP curtailing the spending of large privately owned clubs as well as increasing the relative
spending power of large publicly owned clubs (Jaker and Gerretson, 2021). Nonetheless, with
the consideration of the introduction of Financial Fair Play in the analysis of the Champions
League and “big 5 European leagues”, discussion can be shifted towards the financial
performance of clubs.
A major indicator of financial health and performance of a publicly traded entity is its
stock price. It so happens that 22 major European football clubs are publicly traded. In an
analysis of the share prices of these clubs in comparison with traditional European securities,
“football stocks” were decidedly in an asset class of their own (Prigge and Tegtmeier, 2020).
This class differentiation was based on football stocks offering differing returns and thus, the
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opportunity to diversify a portfolio to achieve more efficient risk-return combinations. However,
institutional investors also consider the fact that football stocks offer weaker returns than
traditional stocks, and because of this deem football stocks to be unattractive from a purely
financial point of view. Instead, football stocks attract a unique kind of investor who cares about
more than dividends and capital gains. This investor gains extra benefit from fan allegiance or
entertainment (Prigge and Tegtmeier, 2020). This is known as an investor focus on a return on
objective (ROO).
Another class of investors into European football clubs that must be considered is large
funds acquiring a stake in a privately owned club. In recent years, there has a been a large
movement of hedge funds and private equity investing cash into European football clubs in
exchange for large chunks of ownership. The hesitancy of U.S. firms diving into the world of
football thus far has been football clubs’ historically “ugly business model” (Perez and Hellier,
2021). The high debt, inflated player salaries, and pressure from extremely passionate fans cause
a lot of uncertainty in the industry. Yet, firms recognize the opportunity to benefit from such
investments and are clawing their way in via a few targeted strategies: buying smaller clubs,
investing in large, historical clubs in financial crisis, buying multiple teams in an effort to
diversify, and investing in leagues as a whole rather than individual teams (Perez and Hellier,
2021). While this research does not directly answer the question of how increased transfer
spending affects the financial health of a club, it provides a unique perspective on how a sample
of European football clubs are viewed through the lens of individual and institutional investors.
In order to consider the growing investment strategy of buying multiple clubs, Multi Club
Ownership (MCO) can be investigated for a potential competitive advantage it offers over Single
Club Ownership (SCO). According to Dias (2021), MCO does offer an advantage with regards to
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revenue capture, on-field performance, brand internationalization, and other operating
efficiencies. Thus, it can be expected to grow in practice. Nonetheless, it most likely will never
become prevalent in the football world given the extreme wealth required to own multiple clubs
as well as possible barriers that could be imposed by football’s international governing bodies –
Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and Union of European Football
Associations (UEFA) (Dias, 2021).
Manchester United Football Club (MUFC) provides a unique case study opportunity as
one of the largest football clubs in Europe. Furthermore, it is a club that falls within the scope of
this thesis as they play in the English Premier League. Interestingly, they have enjoyed spells as
a publicly traded club as well as a privately owned club. Manchester United illustrates the
emergence of transnational capitalism in the world of sports, and European football in particular
(Velayutham &Velayutham, 2016). Sharp increases in foreign investment directly into
Manchester United as well as other EPL clubs demonstrate the global appeal and financial
opportunity of English football (Velayutham &Velayutham, 2016). Given that the financial
performance of large English football clubs relies heavily on performance as an important
revenue generator and spending on players as their largest expense, an analysis of the
relationship between the two is essential.
Fortuitously, a substantial body of research exists on the question of whether larger
payroll and higher transfer spending do in fact improve performance within European football’s
professional leagues. After investigating a representative sample of 39 football clubs in all of
England’s professional football leagues over 26 seasons from 1973-74 to 1998-99, Hall,
Szymanski, and Zimbalist (2002) find a very strong correlation between payroll and final placing
in the league standings, as evidenced by an R squared of 0.9439. This correlation proved to be
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significantly stronger than the correlation in the MLB, the only other major professional sports
league where owners have a comparable degree of financial freedom. Illustrated by an R squared
of approximately 0.24, yearly spending in the MLB only accounts for about 24% of yearly
winning percentages (Hall et al., 2002).
Jaker and Gerretson (2021) perform an adjacent analysis of investment in talented
players, ownership structure, and club performance utilizing UEFA Champions League
tournaments from 2006-2018 as their case study. Interestingly, they do not find a strong
relationship between ownership type and performance. Privately owned clubs as well as publicly
owned clubs and clubs “influenced by” the public did not perform significantly differently.
However, Jaker and Gerretson (2021) did find that greater investment in players increases the
probability of reaching later stages in the competition (Jaker, Gerretson, 2021). This finding
corroborates the conclusions reached by Hall et al. (2002) that payroll plays a significant role in
predicting on-field performance.
In a similar attempt to analyze team performance and financial capacity, research has
been conducted across the five major European football leagues: English Premier League,
French Ligue 1, Spanish La Liga, German Bundesliga, and Italian Serie A. The primary focus of
this research was to determine how much a good start to the season matters to how the team
would place at the end of the season. Lago-Penas and Sampaio (2015) stratify clubs into groups
based on budget (High Range, Upper Mid-Range, Lower-Mid Range, and Low Range) and
analyze three consecutive seasons from 2010-11 to 2012-13. From here, Lago-Penas and
Sampaio (2015) determine a strong start to the season does have a statistically significant impact
on the final placing of the Low and Lower-Mid Range Budget Clubs. Yet, it does not on the
High Range Budget Clubs. Instead, the High Range Budget Clubs tend to place where their
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financial capability suggests that they would, regardless of how well they began the season. This
implies another instance of a strong causal relationship between higher spending on players and
club performance.
As can be discerned from the body of research consisting of case analyses ranging from
England to the five major European domestic leagues to the UEFA Champions League, a
significant correlation between the size of a club’s payroll and on-field performance is well
documented. This thesis explores a nuance that previous literature on the subject has not
addressed: How quickly does increasing transfer spending and payroll lead to winning? What
kind of timetable can stakeholders in English Premier League clubs generally expect with
regards to better performance based on the amount of investment in more talented players?

Analysis and Results
The research conducted by Hall et al. (2002) on the causality between team performance
and payroll in Major League Baseball as well as in English football provides a solid framework
to begin collecting and analyzing relevant data. As such, my first step in conducting empirical
research is to replicate their process and statistical analysis with an updated dataset running from
the 1992-93 to 2020-21 English Premier League seasons. One variation in my dataset is that it
only includes the top flight of English soccer, the Premier League, as opposed to all levels as in
the research conducted by Hall et al. (2002). More specifically, it includes teams which have
competed for a minimum of three seasons in the top flight during the time period of 1992-2021.
The first step in analyzing the data is to take each season from the 1992-93 season to the
2020-2021 season and assign each club a rank between 1-20 corresponding to the place they
finished the season. Next, I assign each club a rank between 1-20 in terms of how high their
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transfer expenditures were in that year. Number one indicates the highest spending team while
number 20 indicates the lowest spending team. Then, I run a simple linear regression to test if a
relationship exists between the absolute rank in performance that season and the absolute rank in
transfer spending. Interestingly, in 13 of the 29 seasons a statistically significant relationship (pvalue < .05) exists between absolute rank in performance and absolute rank in transfer spending.
The 2007-08 season was not quite significant but very close. Another observation to note is that
more recent seasons appear more likely to have statistically significant relationships between the
variables. From the 2005-06 season onwards, 10 out of 16 seasons were significant, or 62.5%.
This compares to the seasons prior to 2005-06 in which only 3 out of 13 seasons, or 23.1%, were
significantly related.

Table 1.

Year of
Season
1992-93
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
2006-07
2007-08
2008-09

Regression
Coefficient
0.2706
0.2860
0.5700
0.3639
0.0872
0.2615
0.2211
0.4982
0.1987
0.6827
0.3263
0.2842
0.2556
0.6406
0.2451
0.4195
0.5173

P-Value of
Regression
0.2188
0.1799
0.0114
0.1147
0.7146
0.2660
0.3490
0.0387
0.4071
0.0009
0.1603
0.2246
0.2767
0.0023
0.2976
0.0655
0.0195

5 Year Rolling
Average of
Regression
Coefficient
#N/A
#N/A
#N/A
#N/A
0.3155
0.3137
0.3007
0.2864
0.2533
0.3724
0.3854
0.3980
0.3495
0.4379
0.3504
0.3690
0.4156
11

2009-10
2010-11
2011-12
2012-13
2013-14
2014-15
2015-16
2016-17
2017-18
2018-19
2019-20
2020-21

0.5338
0.5042
0.3647
0.4902
0.6395
0.6707
0.0633
0.6724
0.6375
0.1532
0.2582
0.6526

0.0153
0.0233
0.1110
0.0282
0.0012
0.0012
0.7918
0.0026
0.0096
0.5098
0.2675
0.0018

0.4713
0.4440
0.4679
0.4820
0.5065
0.5338
0.4457
0.5072
0.5367
0.4394
0.3569
0.4748

This table reports the results of a regression of absolute rank in performance against
absolute rank in spending, separately for each season between 1992-1993 and 20202021. Statistically significant regression coefficients (p-value < 5%) are highlighted in
green.

This investigation, while possibly proving helpful, does not account for the magnitude of
the difference in transfer spending between each absolute rank in transfer spending. For example,
the number one ranked team in spending may spend $300m (USD) while the number two team
may only spend $150m and the number three ranked team spends $140m. In order to account for
differences such as these, a relative spending measure must be utilized. Hall et al. (2002) applies
a relative spending measure by calculating the average spending of each team in the league as a
whole and then dividing the spending of each specific team by that season’s league average. For
instance, if a team spends $200m on transfer expenditures in a season but the league average is
only $100m, they are assigned a relative spending measure of 2.0. If they spend $50m compared
to the league average of $100m, they are assigned a relative spending measure of 0.5.
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To proceed with this version of the analysis, I transformed each year of data by
converting each team’s spending to its relative spending measure. From there, I performed the
same simple linear regression. The results from this analysis, utilizing a relative spending
measure as opposed to the absolute rank in spending, differed slightly from the first analysis.
This time, 15 of the 29 seasons showed a strong correlation (p-value < .05) between absolute
rank in performance and the relative spending measure; this is a higher proportion than the 13
that showed this correlation in the previous analysis. It should be noted that the 2009-2010
season would have also shown a very strong correlation if it were not for the singular outlier of
Manchester City who spent approximately five times the league average but only finished in 5 th
place. Because of the interesting divide of the 2005-2006 season present in the previous analysis,
I compared the two time frames once again. The more recent time frame still exhibited a higher
proportion of seasons in which a strong correlation was present, nine out of 16 compared to six
out of 13 in the older time frame. Yet, this difference is less stark (56.25% compared to 62.50%
in the first analysis).
Table 2.

Year of
Season
1992-93
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03

Regression
Coefficient
-2.3767
-4.0359
-5.8283
-3.4833
-1.4923
-2.5031
-0.3603
-3.8890
-3.5900
-5.4685
-2.3853

P-Value of
Regression
0.1696
0.0132
0.0123
0.0434
0.5363
0.3033
0.8303
0.0144
0.0881
0.0054
0.1180

5 Year Rolling
Average of
Regression
Coefficient
#N/A
#N/A
#N/A
#N/A
-3.4433
-3.4686
-2.7334
-2.3456
-2.3669
-3.1622
-3.1386
13

2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
2006-07
2007-08
2008-09
2009-10
2010-11
2011-12
2012-13
2013-14
2014-15
2015-16
2016-17
2017-18
2018-19
2019-20
2020-21

-1.4315
-1.9691
-4.5606
-2.4389
-4.1999
-1.8650
-2.2006
-2.4338
-3.9384
-4.6392
-4.4240
-4.8395
-2.1726
-6.3482
-5.7068
-3.5514
-2.8775
-5.0503

0.0604
0.0289
0.0011
0.1462
0.0588
0.2132
0.0991
0.0139
0.0073
0.0084
0.0053
0.0005
0.3285
0.0032
0.0003
0.1069
0.1510
0.0033

-3.3528
-2.9689
-3.1630
-2.5571
-2.9200
-3.0067
-3.0530
-2.6277
-2.9276
-3.0154
-3.5272
-4.0550
-4.0028
-4.4847
-4.6982
-4.5237
-4.1313
-4.7068

This table reports the results of a regression of absolute rank in performance against
Hall’s relative measure of spending, separately for each season between 1992-1993 and
2020-2021. Statistically significant regression coefficients (p-value < 5%) are
highlighted in green.

One item worth clarifying is the difference in signs on the regression coefficients
between the first analysis and the second. In the first analysis, I compare absolute rank in
performance with absolute rank in payroll. Intuitively, a “low” rank in performance such as 1 st or
2nd place should coincide with a “low” rank in transfer spending such as 1 st or 2nd and the same
applies to a team with a “high” rank in performance and transfer spending. This creates an
upward sloping trendline in the scatterplots of the data in each season, thus the positive
regression coefficients. Meanwhile, in the second analysis, I compare absolute rank in
performance with Hall’s relative spending measure. Considering the way the relative spending
14

measure is calculated, the higher-ranking payrolls result in higher spending measures. The 1 st
ranked team in transfer spending might have a relative spending measure greater than 3.0 while
the 20th ranked team in transfer spending likely has a relative spending measure barely above
zero. Because of the way this works, clubs with “low” absolute ranks in performance are
expected to coincide with clubs who have “high” relative spending measures. This creates a
downward sloping trendline, thus the negative regression coefficients. This difference is
illustrated by the corresponding scatterplots from the 2020-21 season (both of which were
considered statistically significant):

2020-2021
25
20
15
10
5
0
0

5

10

15

20

25

Figure 1. Regression analysis of absolute rank in performance with absolute rank in spending
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2020-2021
3.500
3.000
2.500
2.000
1.500
1.000
0.500
0.000
0
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25

Figure 2. Regression analysis of absolute rank in performance with Hall relative spending
measure

While the above data analysis served as a helpful starting point, there is not much power
in conducting linear regression with datasets containing only 20 teams. In order to investigate the
significance of the relationship between absolute rank in performance and absolute rank in
transfer expenditures more fully, all of the years were combined into one large, pooled
regression. This regression revealed a strong positive regression coefficient evidenced by a p
value far below the threshold of 0.05 (4.028e-24). However, a limitation of this analysis is it
assumes each observation is independent. This is unfortunately not a valid assumption given a
particular team in one season is not independent of that same team in a prior season. Many
players acquired in the transfer market in one season may persist into subsequent seasons.
The pooled regression was replicated to investigate the relationship between absolute
rank in performance and Hall’s relative spending measure. In this instance, an even stronger
positive regression coefficient was revealed with a p-value once again well below 0.05 (4.907e16

28). This, consistent with the year-by-year simple regression analysis, illustrated a stronger
relationship when utilizing Hall’s relative spending measure than just the absolute rank in
spending.
Something else I investigated was whether the pooled regression differed between time
periods. Using the same split as was discussed in the year-by-year simple regression analysis
(1992-2005 and 2005-2021), another pooled regression was conducted. Both time periods
revealed a very strong relationship as they both had significant p-values. Yet, as was discovered
in the simple regression analysis, the more recent time period illustrated a stronger relationship
than the older time period. 1992-2005 had a p-value of 3.346e-08 compared to 2005-2021, which
had a p-value of 2.051e-18. The same dynamic was observed in the pooled regression using
Hall’s relative spending measure. In that case, 1992-2005 had a p-value of 4.185e-10 while
2005-2021 had a p-value of 5.959e-21. Interestingly, in both pooled regression analyses, the
aggregate analysis had a higher p-value than in either analysis split by time period.
In order to further investigate if there was a significant difference between these
“supposedly” arbitrary time periods, I re-ran the pooled regression analysis with an added
dummy variable to delineate between time periods. Essentially, every data point from 1992-2005
was assigned a 0 while every data point after 2005 was assigned a 1. The resultant regression
output indicated no significant difference between the two time periods in either the analysis
using absolute rank in spending or using Hall’s relative spending measure (p-value of 0.754 and
0.566 respectively). This likely eliminates the need to continue to analyze these two differing
time periods and instead allows focusing on the dataset as a whole or on a season-by-season
basis.
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While all the analyses to this point have certainly been helpful, they rely strongly on rank
variable data: absolute rank in performance, absolute rank in spending, and Hall’s relative
spending measure. Staying true to methods used by Hall et al. (2002), it is useful to perform a
log transformation on all of this data. By converting the rank variables to logarithmic variables,
the data moves from uniform to normally distributed and symmetrical. This improves the
statistical quality of the data as I continue to run more regression analysis. The transformation for
absolute rank in performance becomes -log(absolute rank in performance/[21-absolute rank in
performance]). The transformation for absolute rank in spending becomes -log(absolute rank in
spending/[21-absolute rank in spending]). Finally, the transformation for Hall’s relative spending
measure is the -log(payroll/average payroll for the year). Especially for the relative spending
measure variable, this log transformation effectively handles the skewness of the data which
arises when a certain club spends far more than the rest of the league in a given season.
After improving the statistical quality of the data, I re-ran the simple regression analysis
with the absolute rank in spending and the simple regression analysis with Hall’s relative
spending measure on a season-by-season basis. In the case of the analysis with the absolute rank
in spending, results were very similar; however, one additional season (2007-2008) was found to
have a higher regression coefficient and a p-value now below 0.05 when prior to the log
transformation it was just above the threshold at 0.0588.

Table 3.

Year of
Season
1992-93
1993-94

Regression
Coefficient
0.2301
0.3278

P-Value of
Regression
0.3028
0.1207

5 Year Rolling
Average of
Regression
Coefficient
#N/A
#N/A
18

1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
2006-07
2007-08
2008-09
2009-10
2010-11
2011-12
2012-13
2013-14
2014-15
2015-16
2016-17
2017-18
2018-19
2019-20
2020-21

0.4810
0.2467
0.1342
0.2459
0.1881
0.5149
0.2026
0.6236
0.3186
0.3531
0.3131
0.6820
0.2989
0.4558
0.4794
0.4871
0.4503
0.3619
0.4782
0.5510
0.5993
0.0290
0.6046
0.6689
0.1174
0.2856
0.6064

0.0234
0.2944
0.5726
0.2901
0.4271
0.0428
0.3789
0.0033
0.1709
0.1267
0.1789
0.0009
0.2004
0.0434
0.0325
0.0294
0.0433
0.1146
0.0330
0.0049
0.0052
0.9048
0.0078
0.0093
0.5961
0.2196
0.0046

#N/A
#N/A
0.2840
0.2871
0.2592
0.2660
0.2571
0.3550
0.3696
0.4026
0.3622
0.4581
0.3932
0.4206
0.4458
0.4806
0.4343
0.4469
0.4514
0.4657
0.4882
0.4039
0.4524
0.4906
0.4038
0.3411
0.4566

This table reports the results of a regression of the log transformation of absolute rank in
performance against the log transformation of absolute rank in spending, separately for
each season between 1992-1993 and 2020-2021. Statistically significant regression
coefficients (p-value < 5%) are highlighted in green.

In the case of the analysis with Hall’s relative spending measure, results were also fairly
similar. The number of statistically significant seasons did drop from 15 to 13, however. The
1995-96, 2004-05, 2012-2013, and 2013-2014 flipped from significant to not significant
19

following the log transformation. Meanwhile, the 2003-04 and 2009-10 flipped from not
significant to significant following the log transformation.

Table 4.

Year of
Season
1992-93
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
2006-07
2007-08
2008-09
2009-10
2010-11
2011-12
2012-13
2013-14
2014-15
2015-16
2016-17
2017-18
2018-19
2019-20
2020-21

Regression
Coefficient
-0.1522
-1.0174
-0.7906
-0.1211
-0.1201
-0.6739
-0.3717
-1.0323
-0.9894
-1.1489
-0.5218
-0.4615
-0.4438
-1.3089
-0.7432
-0.7935
-0.9545
-0.9923
-0.6324
-0.9592
-0.7923
-0.7213
-0.7342
-0.1865
-1.9327
-1.5653
-0.8945
-0.3333
-0.7010

P-Value of
Regression
0.6519
0.0095
0.0380
0.7221
0.8534
0.2623
0.4398
0.0146
0.1052
0.0068
0.1029
0.0268
0.1521
0.0009
0.1351
0.1025
0.0603
0.0495
0.0410
0.0270
0.0568
0.0712
0.0207
0.7714
0.0018
0.0008
0.1019
0.3531
0.0237

5 Year Rolling
Average of
Regression
Coefficient
#N/A
#N/A
#N/A
#N/A
-0.4403
-0.5446
-0.4155
-0.4638
-0.6375
-0.8432
-0.8128
-0.8308
-0.7131
-0.7770
-0.6958
-0.7502
-0.8488
-0.9585
-0.8232
-0.8664
-0.8661
-0.8195
-0.7679
-0.6787
-0.8734
-1.0280
-1.0626
-0.9824
-1.0853
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This table reports the results of a regression of the log transformation of absolute rank in
performance against the log transformation of Hall’s relative spending measure,
separately for each season between 1992-1993 and 2020-2021. Statistically significant
regression coefficients (p-value < 5%) are highlighted in green.

Keeping with the prior methodology, I then moved to the pooled regression as it
constitutes a much stronger sample size than the individual seasons on their own. In both the
absolute rank of spending and relative spending measure cases, rerunning the pooled regression
with the logarithmic transformation of the data points netted similar results. Both outputs kept
consistent with the outputs of the pooled regressions in that the results were very statistically
significant as evidenced by their p-values. Interestingly though, in each case, the output was
slightly less statistically significant. The P-values dropped from 4.03E-24 to 1.24E-22 in the
absolute rank case and from 4.91E-28 to 1.60E-21 in the relative spending measure case. A
marginal reduction, but a reduction, nonetheless.
The final form of statistical analysis I applied to my dataset is Granger causality. As is
well known, correlation does not necessarily imply causation. Therefore, up until this point, I
could not reliably draw conclusions that increases in spending directly cause improvements in
performance and vice versa simply from the regression analysis showing correlation alone.
Granger causality undertakes this challenge by utilizing time series data to assess whether one
variable causes another based on a specified number of lags. The actual validity of this test is still
open to debate; thus, for the purpose of this research, we will use the term “x granger-causes y”
or “transfer spending granger-causes performance.”
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One important assumption of the Granger causality test is the time series data are
stationary. In order to improve the stationarity of my data, I calculated the first difference of each
variable and applied the granger test to that data instead of the original data. The increase in
stationarity resulting from this differencing is illustrated by the graphs of Chelsea’s transfer
spending and performance (both absolute and relative) below:
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Figure 4.
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Figure 6.
In order to effectively apply Granger Causality analysis, I perform a multivariate
regression analysis. In this multivariate regression analysis, the independent variable is the
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current year’s performance measured by absolute rank in the league table. The dependent
variables are then one year lagged transfer spending, one year lagged performance, two year
lagged transfer spending, two year lagged performance, and so on. In order to achieve this
format, I translated the original list time-series data into columns and offset the columns by one
year, two years, and so on to create the lag that Granger causality analysis calls for. Using
multivariate regression analysis, I have complete control over each individual sample being
analyzed. After cleaning the data samples by removing instances in which 1993 performance was
lagging to 2021 spending of another team and the instances in which 2020 performance was
lagging to 2007 spending, the multivariate regression was now ready to run.
The results turned out to be very intriguing. Transfer spending was found to Granger
cause performance at a one-year lag and a two-year lag. However, it no longer Granger caused
performance at a three-year lag. This is indicated in the table below by the highlighted cells in
the one-year lag and two-year lag, but the lack of highlighting in the three-year lag. Note also,
that the negative coefficients in the tables are a result of the first differenced data being used
instead of the original data in order to improve stationarity as was discussed previously.
Table 5.

Intercept
1 Year Lagged Spending
1 Year Lagged Performance
2 Year Lagged Spending
2 Year Lagged Performance
3 Year Lagged Spending
3 Year Lagged Performance

Coefficients
0.4034
-0.5371
-0.5052
-0.5217
-0.2928
0.0410
-0.1129

t-Stat
2.0278
-2.2876
-9.3858
-2.0806
-5.3979
0.1756
-2.4614

P-value
0.0433
0.0227
<0.001
0.0381
<0.001
0.8607
0.0143
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In addition, after re-running the same multivariate regression but with the independent
and dependent variables flipped, I found that performance did not Granger cause transfer
spending at any specified lag time. This is indicated by the two highlighted cells showing pvalues greater than 0.05.
Table 6.

Intercept
1 Year Lagged Performance
1 Year Lagged Spending
2 Year Lagged Performance
2 Year Lagged Spending

Coefficients
-0.0221
-0.0029
-0.4410
-0.0066
-0.2569

t-Stat
-0.5562
-0.3022
-9.4720
-0.7663
-5.5565

P-value
0.5784
0.7627
<0.001
0.4439
<0.001

A final item worth noting is the statistically significant p-value outputs from the lagged
performance in Table 5 and the lagged spending in Table 6. These outputs are purely a result of
the way in which the multivariate regression analysis was structured in excel and do not
contribute to the larger Granger causality analysis. Of course, when testing if transfer spending
Granger causes performance, the output is going to show as performance causing performance.
Similarly, when testing if performance Granger causes transfer spending, the output is going to
show transfer spending causing transfer spending.

Discussion
Before diving into deeper discussion about the featured regression analysis and granger
analysis above, I’d like to preface the debate with discussion of the transfer spending and
budgeting framework that English Premier League clubs operate within compared to Major
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League Soccer (MLS) and other American professional sports leagues. Prior to the introduction
of Financial Fair Play (FFP) in the 2011-2012 season, there was no regulation or limit to how
much clubs could choose to spend in acquiring players from other teams through the transfer
market. Of course, most clubs were still cognizant of their financial standing as a business and
still generally acted financially responsible. This absolute freedom in allowing each club to
choose how much they want to spend may be a foreign concept to most Americans who are
accustomed to the structured salary cap systems present in the NFL, NBA, and MLB. Under a
strict salary cap, the league sets a limit and expects each team to construct their roster without
exceeding the limit. For example, the 2022 NFL salary cap is set to be $208.2 Million USD per
team. The MLB differs slightly in that instead of a hard cap, they utilize a luxury tax system in
which very high taxes are levied on teams that exceed the $230 million USD limit to discourage
further outrageous spending and promote competitive balance.
The MLS sits in a unique position as it juxtaposes competing in the internationally based
soccer world while also exhibiting typical American sports league characteristics such as a
player drafts and no relegation. Because of this position, they have implemented an incredibly
complex system to regulate the acquisition and exchange of players (See Appendix A). The stark
differences between how clubs in the EPL operate versus teams in the MLS versus other
American sports franchises are precisely what sparked investigation into this relationship
between player spending and performance. Based on these differences, I would hypothesize that
a similar type of analysis performed on the MLS and other American sports leagues would not
yield similar results.
A previously mentioned pertinent development is UEFA’s implementation of Financial
Fair Play (FFP) regulations. FFP was introduced in the 2011-2012 season as a response to a
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number of clubs “overspending” and thereby threatening the long-term financial health of
themselves. According to UEFA, fifty percent of clubs are operating at a loss and the goal is not
to hurt clubs but instead help them operate responsibly in the marketplace (Paul, 2021). At its
core, FFP limits clubs’ transfer spending to their gross revenue.
Many opponents of FFP have criticized its questionable legality and it being designed to
protect the status quo. In effect, the large, wealthy, historically-successful clubs bring in more
money than smaller clubs. Under FFP, they will always be allowed to spend more money on
transfers than smaller clubs. My research does not suggest that the introduction of FFP rules has
had a strong impact on the relationship between transfer spending and performance in the
English Premier League. Prior to its introduction, eight out of 19 seasons, or 42.1% had a
significant relationship; since its introduction, five out of 10 seasons, or only 50%, have had a
significant relationship. Obviously, the sample size of each of these observations is far too
limited to be able to draw any solid conclusions regarding the claim of FFP worsening the
competitive balance. However, what limited data does exist would suggest that FFP may not
have a powerful effect going forward. Nevertheless, UEFA has been rumored to have plans in
effect to abolish FFP as we currently know it and transition to a salary cap and luxury system
very similar to the one in effect in Major League Baseball (Paul, 2021). They are set to meet in
April of 2022 to discuss this possibility further.
Now, after completing such comprehensive data analysis and briefly discussing the
results of such analysis in the previous section, I believe it will be helpful to utilize this section
of the thesis to complement the hard, quantitative results with some qualitative discussion and
some additional implications of the research. First, it is important to mention and credit the
research of Hall et al. (2002) for providing this manuscript’s theoretical framework involving
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the analysis of the relationship between transfer spending and performance in professional
English football. It is essential to note, however, that my paper applies to a larger, more recent
set of data. This thesis’ data set extends all the way to the 2020-2021 season as opposed to Hall
et al. (2002), which concluded with the 1999-2000 season. Furthermore, Hall et al. (2002) takes a
sweeping view on professional English football by looking at each tier from the Premier League
down to the fifth division whereas I narrow the focus to the Premier League alone. This
extension of the data set to the present, while simultaneously focusing the scope, provides for a
novel contribution.
Hall et al. (2002) concluded that player spending did to statistically cause improved
performance in English Soccer. My results confirmed that this finding extends through the 2021
season. Similarly, it supports that the relationship stands in the English Premier League by itself.
Interestingly, every season on its own did not demonstrate transfer spending statistically causing
performance. However, when pooled together, the data overwhelmingly showed that transfer
spending did statistically cause improved performance. It should also be noted that a substantial
number of stand-alone seasons did also demonstrate this relationship: 13 of 29 when utilizing the
absolute rank in spending and 15 of 29 when utilizing Hall’s relative spending measure.
Further contributing to the novelty of this thesis, I performed Granger causality analysis
with various lag times in order to address the speed at which transfer spending improves
performance. The results suggest a few intriguing things.
First off, past transfer spending did granger cause current performance. Interestingly, it
did so at a one- and two-year lag, but not at a three-year lag. This indicates that a club could
decide to make a large investment in acquiring players and expect improved results in the league
table the following season. Furthermore, this would suggest that sustaining a high rate of transfer
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spending for two years should also lead to improved performance in the league table. Where the
causation drops off is at the three-year time period. Intuitively, this makes sense. Over a threeyear period there can be significant roster turnover and many players who were acquired via
transfer 3 years ago may not even be on the current roster leading to this lack of cause and effect.
Thus, this illustrates a requirement for clubs to commit to a sustained, high level of transfer
spending in order to continue to perform at the highest level. Clubs cannot rely on spending that
occurred over two years ago to cause them to perform better.
Secondly, past performance did not granger cause current transfer spending. This is an
interesting takeaway when you consider the revenue sharing structure of the English Premier
League. The English Premier League divides television revenue to the clubs based on a formula
of 50% divided evenly no matter what, 25% divided depending on the number of games shown
on national broadcasts, and 25% based on the final position in the league table. This final portion
is known as merit pay based on performance. It generally runs from approximately $2.6 Million
USD for the 20th place team and increases by $2.6 Million USD for each place up to
approximately $31.5 Million Dollars (Ghosh, 2022). It is also important to note that international
television revenue is split 100% evenly between each club; international tv revenue accounts for
the largest portion of the English Premier League’s total revenue at approximately $1.3 billion
USD per season (Ghosh, 2022). This discrepancy in revenue based on table results might cause
some to believe that it would lead the teams who perform better to spend more. However, upon
closer inspection, this does not turn out to be true at a statistically significant level. I conjecture
that the reason for this may be that this difference in merit pay is not substantial when
comparing the overall revenues for each club. For instance, in the 2019-2020 season the top
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placing team Liverpool earned £153 Million while the 13 th placed Newcastle United earned £120
Million and the 20th placed Norwich City still earned £96.5 Million (Ghosh, 2022).
Transfer spending does indeed statistically cause improved performance in the Premier
League and sustained spending is necessary to maintain this improved performance level.
Consequently, it is worthwhile to discuss a few prominent teams that have demonstrated this
relationship. The first team that identified this relationship and famously put it into practice was
Blackburn Rovers from 1993-1999. At this time, Blackburn Rovers were owned by Jack Walker
who made it loud and clear that he did not care about the club in terms of a long-term financial
investment, but instead only wanted to win the Premier League and would do so at any cost. So,
in order to achieve this self-proclaimed goal, Jack Walker and Blackburn Rovers did indeed
spend. From the Premier League’s inception in 1993 to 1995, Blackburn Rovers posted absolute
ranks in transfer spending of 1st, 1st, and 5th as well as relative spending measures of 3.562,
3.562, and 1.56. The incessant transfer spending paid off and Blackburn Rovers won the Premier
League in the 1994-1995 season. Because of this ludicrous level of spending for a small club,
Blackburn Rovers was unable to sustain the high transfer spending and subsequently posted
absolute ranks in transfer spending of 5th, 20th, and 13th as well as relative spending measures of
1.609, 0, and 0.803 from 1996-1998. The decreased transfer spending, as predicted by the data
analysis conducted in this thesis, resulted in a marked decrease in performance on the field.
Blackburn Rovers ended up being relegated from the Premier League entirely in 1999.
Blackburn is perhaps the best example of this relationship in practice as they exhibited both the
highest and lowest ends of the spectrum of transfer spending throughout their time in the English
Premier League.
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Blackburn represents only one example among a few others that have followed the
blueprint of incredible transfer spending to achieve football success. Prior to 2008 when
Manchester City was famously acquired by Sheikh Mansour and the Abu Dhabi United Group
for Development and Investment (ADUG), they were still regulars in the English Premier
League but spent and performed at a fairly modest level. In the years that they were in the EPL
(1993-1996 and 2001-2007), spent roughly 0.868x the amount of the rest of the league and their
average rank in performance was 14. Essentially, they were just below the league average in both
categories. From 2008 and onward, the new ownership group began to increase investment in the
club and transfer spending substantially. From 2008-2021, the average relative spending measure
has been nearly 2.67x higher than the rest of the league. Subsequently, their average rank in
performance has skyrocketed up to approximately 3rd place. This transition illustrates a case in
which transfer spending has successfully led to a marked increase in performance.
Chelsea illustrates an extremely similar case to Manchester City. Though they had been a
historically better club than Manchester City prior to the famous 2003 acquisition by Roman
Abramovich, a significant rise in transfer spending post-acquisition also equated to a rise in
performance. Prior to 2003, Chelsea spent at a rate of approximately 1.293x the league average
and maintained an average rank in performance of 7.7. This is slightly above average in each
category. After Abramovich’s acquisition, they spent at a rate of 2.65x the rest of the league and
have ended up earning an average placing around 3 rd place as well. The large amounts of
spending have successfully positioned Chelsea among the English Premier League’s elite.
Despite the well-documented cases of Blackburn, Manchester City, and Chelsea
implementing high transfer spending strategies in order to achieve high performance, it is
important to note that of course sport at its core is still full of random anomalies. As the famous
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sports adage goes: “That’s why they play the game.” The conclusions gathered through this
research result from aggregated, long-term data. The 2016 Leicester City English Premier
League title run is perhaps the best example of one such anomaly and is largely regarded as the
most remarkable single season in the English Premier League’s history. In the two years prior to
that title win, Leicester City ranked 17th and 16th in transfer spending which was a rate of 0.05x
and 0.37x the league average, respectively. Yet, they managed to achieve 1 st place in the league
with an incredibly cheap roster of players. In comparison, their squad cost just £72 Million
which was 7x less than Manchester City’s squad which cost £415 Million that season.
A final case study worth discussion is that of Newcastle United as a good example of a
middling English Premier League team. Newcastle United has been a regular of the EPL
competing in 26 out of 29 seasons. They have spent above the league average in 14 out of those
26 seasons and below the league average in 12 of them. They have also enjoyed varying degrees
of success, performing as high as 2nd place when they were spending at their peak in 1996 and
1997 and slipping as low as relegation in 2017 when spending over the previous seasons had
been well below the league average. The lesson learned with Newcastle United is that a large
number of Premier League clubs tend to hover in the middle tier of the league and that they are
often only taken as far as their transfer spending will allow them. Just recently, however,
Newcastle United was taken over by a consortium of investors, lead by PIF which is the
sovereign wealth fund of Saudi Arabia. This group has announced plans to greatly increase
investment in Newcastle United (Benge, 2021). My research would suggest that this increased
investment, if directly tied to transfer spending, will lead to a significant increase in Newcastle
United’s performance in the EPL over the next couple of seasons. This will be a fascinating
development to keep an eye on.
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Conclusion
Through the replication of Hall’s methods for regression analysis and granger analysis on
a modernized dataset, this thesis has determined that the conventional wisdom of increased
transfer spending correlating to better performance on the soccer field holds true. Better yet,
transfer spending Granger causes performance at a one-year and two-year lag. This indicates that
stakeholders should expect to see results from their investment in players after only one or two
years. It also suggests continuously sustained high transfer spending is necessary to maintain
high levels of performance. High transfer spending in the short term cannot be expected to
influence performance in the long term.
The exploration of the cases of Blackburn Rovers, Manchester City, and Chelsea nicely
demonstrate the conclusions drawn from this data analysis in the real world. Simultaneously, the
cases of 2016 Leicester City and Newcastle United acknowledge the non-absoluteness of the
relationship between transfer spending and performance in a single season.
So, what about the competitive balance? European football stakeholders don’t seem to
care. Interestingly, UEFA’s Financial Fair Play regulations make no mention of increasing
fairness; they maintain that their purpose is to preserve the financial well-being of the clubs. It
has long been assumed that the wealthiest clubs will achieve the greatest football success, and
this is something that will presumably continue to reign true.
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